- Jan 16, 2016
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Vlad Yasevich authored
[ Upstream commit f6548615 ] skb_reorder_vlan_header is called after the vlan header has been pulled. As a result the offset of the begining of the mac header has been incrased by 4 bytes (VLAN_HLEN). When moving the mac addresses, include this incrase in the offset calcualation so that the mac addresses are copied correctly. Fixes: a6e18ff1 (vlan: Fix untag operations of stacked vlans with REORDER_HEADER off) CC: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> Signed-off-by:
Vladislav Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by:
Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
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Vlad Yasevich authored
[ Upstream commit a6e18ff1 ] When we have multiple stacked vlan devices all of which have turned off REORDER_HEADER flag, the untag operation does not locate the ethernet addresses correctly for nested vlans. The reason is that in case of REORDER_HEADER flag being off, the outer vlan headers are put back and the mac_len is adjusted to account for the presense of the header. Then, the subsequent untag operation, for the next level vlan, always use VLAN_ETH_HLEN to locate the begining of the ethernet header and that ends up being a multiple of 4 bytes short of the actuall beginning of the mac header (the multiple depending on the how many vlan encapsulations ethere are). As a reslult, if there are multiple levles of vlan devices with REODER_HEADER being off, the recevied packets end up being dropped. To solve this, we use skb->mac_len as the offset. The value is always set on receive path and starts out as a ETH_HLEN. The value is also updated when the vlan header manupations occur so we know it will be correct. Signed-off-by:
Vladislav Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Eric Dumazet authored
[ Upstream commit 5037e9ef ] David Wilder reported crashes caused by dst reuse. <quote David> I am seeing a crash on a distro V4.2.3 kernel caused by a double release of a dst_entry. In ipv4_dst_destroy() the call to list_empty() finds a poisoned next pointer, indicating the dst_entry has already been removed from the list and freed. The crash occurs 18 to 24 hours into a run of a network stress exerciser. </quote> Thanks to his detailed report and analysis, we were able to understand the core issue. IP early demux can associate a dst to skb, after a lookup in TCP/UDP sockets. When socket cache is not properly set, we want to store into sk->sk_dst_cache the dst for future IP early demux lookups, by acquiring a stable refcount on the dst. Problem is this acquisition is simply using an atomic_inc(), which works well, unless the dst was queued for destruction from dst_release() noticing dst refcount went to zero, if DST_NOCACHE was set on dst. We need to make sure current refcount is not zero before incrementing it, or risk double free as David reported. This patch, being a stable candidate, adds two new helpers, and use them only from IP early demux problematic paths. It might be possible to merge in net-next skb_dst_force() and skb_dst_force_safe(), but I prefer having the smallest patch for stable kernels : Maybe some skb_dst_force() callers do not expect skb->dst can suddenly be cleared. Can probably be backported back to linux-3.6 kernels Reported-by:
David J. Wilder <dwilder@us.ibm.com> Tested-by:
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by:
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Sergei Shtylyov authored
[ Upstream commit 248be83d ] In a low memory situation the following kernel oops occurs: Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000050 pgd = 8490c000 [00000050] *pgd=4651e831, *pte=00000000, *ppte=00000000 Internal error: Oops: 17 [#1] PREEMPT ARM Modules linked in: CPU: 0 Not tainted (3.4-at16 #9) PC is at skb_put+0x10/0x98 LR is at sh_eth_poll+0x2c8/0xa10 pc : [<8035f780>] lr : [<8028bf50>] psr: 60000113 sp : 84eb1a90 ip : 84eb1ac8 fp : 84eb1ac4 r10: 0000003f r9 : 000005ea r8 : 00000000 r7 : 00000000 r6 : 940453b0 r5 : 00030000 r4 : 9381b180 r3 : 00000000 r2 : 00000000 r1 : 000005ea r0 : 00000000 Flags: nZCv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment user Control: 10c53c7d Table: 4248c059 DAC: 00000015 Process klogd (pid: 2046, stack limit = 0x84eb02e8) [...] This is because netdev_alloc_skb() fails and 'mdp->rx_skbuff[entry]' is left NULL but sh_eth_rx() later uses it without checking. Add such check... Reported-by:
Yasushi SHOJI <yashi@atmark-techno.com> Signed-off-by:
Sergei Shtylyov <sergei.shtylyov@cogentembedded.com> Signed-off-by:
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Hannes Frederic Sowa authored
[ Upstream commit 79462ad0 ] 郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by using a simple program: int socket_fd; struct sockaddr_in addr; addr.sin_port = 0; addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY; addr.sin_family = 10; socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000); connect(socket_fd , &addr,16); AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly, thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and store a zero in the protocol fields. This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which is NULL for raw sockets. kernel: Call Trace: kernel: [<ffffffff816db90e>] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70 kernel: [<ffffffff816db9a4>] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80 kernel: [<ffffffff81645069>] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110 kernel: [<ffffffff810ac51b>] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80 kernel: [<ffffffff810236d8>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200 kernel: [<ffffffff81645e0e>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10 kernel: [<ffffffff81779515>] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89 I found no particular commit which introduced this problem. CVE: CVE-2015-8543 Cc: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com> Reported-by:
郭永刚 <guoyonggang@360.cn> Signed-off-by:
Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by:
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Eric Dumazet authored
[ Upstream commit 9470e24f ] SCTP is lacking proper np->opt cloning at accept() time. TCP and DCCP use ipv6_dup_options() helper, do the same in SCTP. We might later factorize this code in a common helper to avoid future mistakes. Reported-by:
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by:
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Stefan Wahren authored
[ Upstream commit ed7d42e2 ] In case of a tx queue timeout every transmit is blocked until the QCA7000 resets himself and triggers a sync which makes the driver flushs the tx ring. So avoid this blocking situation by triggering the sync immediately after the timeout. Waking the queue doesn't make sense in this situation. Signed-off-by:
Stefan Wahren <stefan.wahren@i2se.com> Fixes: 291ab06e ("net: qualcomm: new Ethernet over SPI driver for QCA7000") Signed-off-by:
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Marcelo Ricardo Leitner authored
[ Upstream commit 50a5ffb1 ] As we are keeping timestamps on when copying the socket, we also have to copy sk_tsflags. This is needed since b9f40e21 ("net-timestamp: move timestamp flags out of sk_flags"). Signed-off-by:
Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com> Acked-by:
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Marcelo Ricardo Leitner authored
[ Upstream commit 01ce63c9 ] Dmitry Vyukov reported that SCTP was triggering a WARN on socket destroy related to disabling sock timestamp. When SCTP accepts an association or peel one off, it copies sock flags but forgot to call net_enable_timestamp() if a packet timestamping flag was copied, leading to extra calls to net_disable_timestamp() whenever such clones were closed. The fix is to call net_enable_timestamp() whenever we copy a sock with that flag on, like tcp does. Reported-by:
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Marcelo Ricardo Leitner authored
[ Upstream commit cb5e173e ] SCTP echoes a cookie o INIT ACK chunks that contains a timestamp, for detecting stale cookies. This cookie is echoed back to the server by the client and then that timestamp is checked. Thing is, if the listening socket is using packet timestamping, the cookie is encoded with ktime_get() value and checked against ktime_get_real(), as done by __net_timestamp(). The fix is to sctp also use ktime_get_real(), so we can compare bananas with bananas later no matter if packet timestamping was enabled or not. Fixes: 52db882f ("net: sctp: migrate cookie life from timeval to ktime") Signed-off-by:
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Pavel Machek authored
[ Upstream commit f2a3771a ] atl1c driver is doing order-4 allocation with GFP_ATOMIC priority. That often breaks networking after resume. Switch to GFP_KERNEL. Still not ideal, but should be significantly better. atl1c_setup_ring_resources() is called from .open() function, and already uses GFP_KERNEL, so this change is safe. Signed-off-by:
Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Acked-by:
Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Signed-off-by:
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Nicolas Dichtel authored
[ Upstream commit 6a61d4db ] Parameters were updated only if the kernel was unable to find the tunnel with the new parameters, ie only if core pamareters were updated (keys, addr, link, type). Now it's possible to update ttl, hoplimit, flowinfo and flags. Fixes: c12b395a ("gre: Support GRE over IPv6") Signed-off-by:
Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Signed-off-by:
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- Dec 15, 2015
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Sasha Levin authored
Signed-off-by:
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- Dec 14, 2015
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Eric Dumazet authored
[ Upstream commit 602dd62d ] Dmitry Vyukov reported a memory leak using IPV6 SCTP sockets. We need to call inet6_destroy_sock() to properly release inet6 specific fields. Reported-by:
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by:
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Konstantin Khlebnikov authored
[ Upstream commit 6adc5fd6 ] Proxy entries could have null pointer to net-device. Signed-off-by:
Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com> Fixes: 84920c14 ("net: Allow ipv6 proxies and arp proxies be shown with iproute2") Signed-off-by:
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Eric Dumazet authored
[ Upstream commit 45f6fad8 ] This patch addresses multiple problems : UDP/RAW sendmsg() need to get a stable struct ipv6_txoptions while socket is not locked : Other threads can change np->opt concurrently. Dmitry posted a syzkaller (http://github.com/google/syzkaller ) program desmonstrating use-after-free. Starting with TCP/DCCP lockless listeners, tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock() and dccp_v6_request_recv_sock() also need to use RCU protection to dereference np->opt once (before calling ipv6_dup_options()) This patch adds full RCU protection to np->opt Reported-by:
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Michal Kubeček authored
[ Upstream commit 264640fc ] If a fragmented multicast packet is received on an ethernet device which has an active macvlan on top of it, each fragment is duplicated and received both on the underlying device and the macvlan. If some fragments for macvlan are processed before the whole packet for the underlying device is reassembled, the "overlapping fragments" test in ip6_frag_queue() discards the whole fragment queue. To resolve this, add device ifindex to the search key and require it to match reassembling multicast packets and packets to link-local addresses. Note: similar patch has been already submitted by Yoshifuji Hideaki in http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/220979/ but got lost and forgotten for some reason. Signed-off-by:
Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz> Signed-off-by:
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Aaro Koskinen authored
[ Upstream commit 3c25a860 ] Commit fcb26ec5 ("broadcom: move all PHY_ID's to header") updated broadcom_tbl to use PHY_IDs, but incorrectly replaced 0x0143bca0 with PHY_ID_BCM5482 (making a duplicate entry, and completely omitting the original). Fix that. Fixes: fcb26ec5 ("broadcom: move all PHY_ID's to header") Signed-off-by:
Aaro Koskinen <aaro.koskinen@iki.fi> Signed-off-by:
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Nikolay Aleksandrov authored
[ Upstream commit 4c698046 ] Similar to ipv4, when destroying an mrt table the static mfc entries and the static devices are kept, which leads to devices that can never be destroyed (because of refcnt taken) and leaked memory. Make sure that everything is cleaned up on netns destruction. Fixes: 8229efda ("netns: ip6mr: enable namespace support in ipv6 multicast forwarding code") CC: Benjamin Thery <benjamin.thery@bull.net> Signed-off-by:
Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com> Reviewed-by:
Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com> Signed-off-by:
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Nikolay Aleksandrov authored
[ Upstream commit 0e615e96 ] When destroying an mrt table the static mfc entries and the static devices are kept, which leads to devices that can never be destroyed (because of refcnt taken) and leaked memory, for example: unreferenced object 0xffff880034c144c0 (size 192): comm "mfc-broken", pid 4777, jiffies 4320349055 (age 46001.964s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 98 53 f0 34 00 88 ff ff 98 53 f0 34 00 88 ff ff .S.4.....S.4.... ef 0a 0a 14 01 02 03 04 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 ................ backtrace: [<ffffffff815c1b9e>] kmemleak_alloc+0x4e/0xb0 [<ffffffff811ea6e0>] kmem_cache_alloc+0x190/0x300 [<ffffffff815931cb>] ip_mroute_setsockopt+0x5cb/0x910 [<ffffffff8153d575>] do_ip_setsockopt.isra.11+0x105/0xff0 [<ffffffff8153e490>] ip_setsockopt+0x30/0xa0 [<ffffffff81564e13>] raw_setsockopt+0x33/0x90 [<ffffffff814d1e14>] sock_common_setsockopt+0x14/0x20 [<ffffffff814d0b51>] SyS_setsockopt+0x71/0xc0 [<ffffffff815cdbf6>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a [<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff Make sure that everything is cleaned on netns destruction. Signed-off-by:
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Daniel Borkmann authored
[ Upstream commit 6900317f ] David and HacKurx reported a following/similar size overflow triggered in a grsecurity kernel, thanks to PaX's gcc size overflow plugin: (Already fixed in later grsecurity versions by Brad and PaX Team.) [ 1002.296137] PAX: size overflow detected in function scm_detach_fds net/core/scm.c:314 cicus.202_127 min, count: 4, decl: msg_controllen; num: 0; context: msghdr; [ 1002.296145] CPU: 0 PID: 3685 Comm: scm_rights_recv Not tainted 4.2.3-grsec+ #7 [ 1002.296149] Hardware name: Apple Inc. MacBookAir5,1/Mac-66F35F19FE2A0D05, [...] [ 1002.296153] ffffffff81c27366 0000000000000000 ffffffff81c27375 ffffc90007843aa8 [ 1002.296162] ffffffff818129ba 0000000000000000 ffffffff81c27366 ffffc90007843ad8 [ 1002.296169] ffffffff8121f838 fffffffffffffffc fffffffffffffffc ffffc90007843e60 [ 1002.296176] Call Trace: [ 1002.296190] [<ffffffff818129ba>] dump_stack+0x45/0x57 [ 1002.296200] [<ffffffff8121f838>] report_size_overflow+0x38/0x60 [ 1002.296209] [<ffffffff816a979e>] scm_detach_fds+0x2ce/0x300 [ 1002.296220] [<ffffffff81791899>] unix_stream_read_generic+0x609/0x930 [ 1002.296228] [<ffffffff81791c9f>] unix_stream_recvmsg+0x4f/0x60 [ 1002.296236] [<ffffffff8178dc00>] ? unix_set_peek_off+0x50/0x50 [ 1002.296243] [<ffffffff8168fac7>] sock_recvmsg+0x47/0x60 [ 1002.296248] [<ffffffff81691522>] ___sys_recvmsg+0xe2/0x1e0 [ 1002.296257] [<ffffffff81693496>] __sys_recvmsg+0x46/0x80 [ 1002.296263] [<ffffffff816934fc>] SyS_recvmsg+0x2c/0x40 [ 1002.296271] [<ffffffff8181a3ab>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x85 Further investigation showed that this can happen when an *odd* number of fds are being passed over AF_UNIX sockets. In these cases CMSG_LEN(i * sizeof(int)) and CMSG_SPACE(i * sizeof(int)), where i is the number of successfully passed fds, differ by 4 bytes due to the extra CMSG_ALIGN() padding in CMSG_SPACE() to an 8 byte boundary on 64 bit. The padding is used to align subsequent cmsg headers in the control buffer. When the control buffer passed in from the receiver side *lacks* these 4 bytes (e.g. due to buggy/wrong API usage), then msg->msg_controllen will overflow in scm_detach_fds(): int cmlen = CMSG_LEN(i * sizeof(int)); <--- cmlen w/o tail-padding err = put_user(SOL_SOCKET, &cm->cmsg_level); if (!err) err = put_user(SCM_RIGHTS, &cm->cmsg_type); if (!err) err = put_user(cmlen, &cm->cmsg_len); if (!err) { cmlen = CMSG_SPACE(i * sizeof(int)); <--- cmlen w/ 4 byte extra tail-padding msg->msg_control += cmlen; msg->msg_controllen -= cmlen; <--- iff no tail-padding space here ... } ... wrap-around F.e. it will wrap to a length of 18446744073709551612 bytes in case the receiver passed in msg->msg_controllen of 20 bytes, and the sender properly transferred 1 fd to the receiver, so that its CMSG_LEN results in 20 bytes and CMSG_SPACE in 24 bytes. In case of MSG_CMSG_COMPAT (scm_detach_fds_compat()), I haven't seen an issue in my tests as alignment seems always on 4 byte boundary. Same should be in case of native 32 bit, where we end up with 4 byte boundaries as well. In practice, passing msg->msg_controllen of 20 to recvmsg() while receiving a single fd would mean that on successful return, msg->msg_controllen is being set by the kernel to 24 bytes instead, thus more than the input buffer advertised. It could f.e. become an issue if such application later on zeroes or copies the control buffer based on the returned msg->msg_controllen elsewhere. Maximum number of fds we can send is a hard upper limit SCM_MAX_FD (253). Going over the code, it seems like msg->msg_controllen is not being read after scm_detach_fds() in scm_recv() anymore by the kernel, good! Relevant recvmsg() handler are unix_dgram_recvmsg() (unix_seqpacket_recvmsg()) and unix_stream_recvmsg(). Both return back to their recvmsg() caller, and ___sys_recvmsg() places the updated length, that is, new msg_control - old msg_control pointer into msg->msg_controllen (hence the 24 bytes seen in the example). Long time ago, Wei Yongjun fixed something related in commit 1ac70e7a ("[NET]: Fix function put_cmsg() which may cause usr application memory overflow"). RFC3542, section 20.2. says: The fields shown as "XX" are possible padding, between the cmsghdr structure and the data, and between the data and the next cmsghdr structure, if required by the implementation. While sending an application may or may not include padding at the end of last ancillary data in msg_controllen and implementations must accept both as valid. On receiving a portable application must provide space for padding at the end of the last ancillary data as implementations may copy out the padding at the end of the control message buffer and include it in the received msg_controllen. When recvmsg() is called if msg_controllen is too small for all the ancillary data items including any trailing padding after the last item an implementation may set MSG_CTRUNC. Since we didn't place MSG_CTRUNC for already quite a long time, just do the same as in 1ac70e7a to avoid an overflow. Btw, even man-page author got this wrong :/ See db939c9b26e9 ("cmsg.3: Fix error in SCM_RIGHTS code sample"). Some people must have copied this (?), thus it got triggered in the wild (reported several times during boot by David and HacKurx). No Fixes tag this time as pre 2002 (that is, pre history tree). Reported-by:
David Sterba <dave@jikos.cz> Reported-by:
HacKurx <hackurx@gmail.com> Cc: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu> Cc: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com> Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Cc: Wei Yongjun <yongjun_wei@trendmicro.com.cn> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reviewed-by:
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Eric Dumazet authored
[ Upstream commit 142a2e7e ] Dmitry provided a syzkaller (http://github.com/google/syzkaller ) generated program that triggers the WARNING at net/ipv4/tcp.c:1729 in tcp_recvmsg() : WARN_ON(tp->copied_seq != tp->rcv_nxt && !(flags & (MSG_PEEK | MSG_TRUNC))); His program is specifically attempting a Cross SYN TCP exchange, that we support (for the pleasure of hackers ?), but it looks we lack proper tcp->copied_seq initialization. Thanks again Dmitry for your report and testings. Signed-off-by:
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Eric Dumazet authored
[ Upstream commit 5d4c9bfb ] tcp_send_rcvq() is used for re-injecting data into tcp receive queue. Problems : - No check against size is performed, allowed user to fool kernel in attempting very large memory allocations, eventually triggering OOM when memory is fragmented. - In case of fault during the copy we do not return correct errno. Lets use alloc_skb_with_frags() to cook optimal skbs. Fixes: 292e8d8c ("tcp: Move rcvq sending to tcp_input.c") Fixes: c0e88ff0 ("tcp: Repair socket queues") Signed-off-by:
Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com> Signed-off-by:
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Eric Dumazet authored
[ Upstream commit 1b8e6a01 ] When a passive TCP is created, we eventually call tcp_md5_do_add() with sk pointing to the child. It is not owner by the user yet (we will add this socket into listener accept queue a bit later anyway) But we do own the spinlock, so amend the lockdep annotation to avoid following splat : [ 8451.090932] net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:923 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage! [ 8451.090932] [ 8451.090932] other info that might help us debug this: [ 8451.090932] [ 8451.090934] [ 8451.090934] rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 1 [ 8451.090936] 3 locks held by socket_sockopt_/214795: [ 8451.090936] #0: (rcu_read_lock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff855c6ac1>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x151/0xe90 [ 8451.090947] #1: (rcu_read_lock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff85618143>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x43/0x2b0 [ 8451.090952] #2: (slock-AF_INET){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff855acda5>] sk_clone_lock+0x1c5/0x500 [ 8451.090958] [ 8451.090958] stack backtrace: [ 8451.090960] CPU: 7 PID: 214795 Comm: socket_sockopt_ [ 8451.091215] Call Trace: [ 8451.091216] <IRQ> [<ffffffff856fb29c>] dump_stack+0x55/0x76 [ 8451.091229] [<ffffffff85123b5b>] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xeb/0x110 [ 8451.091235] [<ffffffff8564544f>] tcp_md5_do_add+0x1bf/0x1e0 [ 8451.091239] [<ffffffff85645751>] tcp_v4_syn_recv_sock+0x1f1/0x4c0 [ 8451.091242] [<ffffffff85642b27>] ? tcp_v4_md5_hash_skb+0x167/0x190 [ 8451.091246] [<ffffffff85647c78>] tcp_check_req+0x3c8/0x500 [ 8451.091249] [<ffffffff856451ae>] ? tcp_v4_inbound_md5_hash+0x11e/0x190 [ 8451.091253] [<ffffffff85647170>] tcp_v4_rcv+0x3c0/0x9f0 [ 8451.091256] [<ffffffff85618143>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x43/0x2b0 [ 8451.091260] [<ffffffff856181b6>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xb6/0x2b0 [ 8451.091263] [<ffffffff85618143>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x43/0x2b0 [ 8451.091267] [<ffffffff85618d38>] ip_local_deliver+0x48/0x80 [ 8451.091270] [<ffffffff85618510>] ip_rcv_finish+0x160/0x700 [ 8451.091273] [<ffffffff8561900e>] ip_rcv+0x29e/0x3d0 [ 8451.091277] [<ffffffff855c74b7>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0xb47/0xe90 Fixes: a8afca03 ("tcp: md5: protects md5sig_info with RCU") Signed-off-by:
Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Signed-off-by:
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Bjørn Mork authored
[ Upstream commit 68242a5a ] Thomas reports " 4gsystems sells two total different LTE-surfsticks under the same name. .. The newer version of XS Stick W100 is from "omega" .. Under windows the driver switches to the same ID, and uses MI03\6 for network and MI01\6 for modem. .. echo "1c9e 9b01" > /sys/bus/usb/drivers/qmi_wwan/new_id echo "1c9e 9b01" > /sys/bus/usb-serial/drivers/option1/new_id T: Bus=01 Lev=01 Prnt=01 Port=03 Cnt=01 Dev#= 4 Spd=480 MxCh= 0 D: Ver= 2.00 Cls=00(>ifc ) Sub=00 Prot=00 MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 1 P: Vendor=1c9e ProdID=9b01 Rev=02.32 S: Manufacturer=USB Modem S: Product=USB Modem S: SerialNumber= C: #Ifs= 5 Cfg#= 1 Atr=80 MxPwr=500mA I: If#= 0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=option I: If#= 1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=option I: If#= 2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=option I: If#= 3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=qmi_wwan I: If#= 4 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=08(stor.) Sub=06 Prot=50 Driver=usb-storage Now all important things are there: wwp0s29f7u2i3 (net), ttyUSB2 (at), cdc-wdm0 (qmi), ttyUSB1 (at) There is also ttyUSB0, but it is not usable, at least not for at. The device works well with qmi and ModemManager-NetworkManager. " Reported-by:
Thomas Schäfer <tschaefer@t-online.de> Signed-off-by:
Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no> Signed-off-by:
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Neil Horman authored
[ Upstream commit 41033f02 ] the OUTMCAST stat is double incremented, getting bumped once in the mcast code itself, and again in the common ip output path. Remove the mcast bump, as its not needed Validated by the reporter, with good results Signed-off-by:
Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Reported-by:
Claus Jensen <claus.jensen@microsemi.com> CC: Claus Jensen <claus.jensen@microsemi.com> CC: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by:
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Jason A. Donenfeld authored
[ Upstream commit b4fe85f9 ] Drivers like vxlan use the recently introduced udp_tunnel_xmit_skb/udp_tunnel6_xmit_skb APIs. udp_tunnel6_xmit_skb makes use of ip6tunnel_xmit, and ip6tunnel_xmit, after sending the packet, updates the struct stats using the usual u64_stats_update_begin/end calls on this_cpu_ptr(dev->tstats). udp_tunnel_xmit_skb makes use of iptunnel_xmit, which doesn't touch tstats, so drivers like vxlan, immediately after, call iptunnel_xmit_stats, which does the same thing - calls u64_stats_update_begin/end on this_cpu_ptr(dev->tstats). While vxlan is probably fine (I don't know?), calling a similar function from, say, an unbound workqueue, on a fully preemptable kernel causes real issues: [ 188.434537] BUG: using smp_processor_id() in preemptible [00000000] code: kworker/u8:0/6 [ 188.435579] caller is debug_smp_processor_id+0x17/0x20 [ 188.435583] CPU: 0 PID: 6 Comm: kworker/u8:0 Not tainted 4.2.6 #2 [ 188.435607] Call Trace: [ 188.435611] [<ffffffff8234e936>] dump_stack+0x4f/0x7b [ 188.435615] [<ffffffff81915f3d>] check_preemption_disabled+0x19d/0x1c0 [ 188.435619] [<ffffffff81915f77>] debug_smp_processor_id+0x17/0x20 The solution would be to protect the whole this_cpu_ptr(dev->tstats)/u64_stats_update_begin/end blocks with disabling preemption and then reenabling it. Signed-off-by:
Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Acked-by:
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lucien authored
[ Upstream commit ed5a377d ] now sctp auth cannot work well when setting a hmacid manually, which is caused by that we didn't use the network order for hmacid, so fix it by adding the transformation in sctp_auth_ep_set_hmacs. even we set hmacid with the network order in userspace, it still can't work, because of this condition in sctp_auth_ep_set_hmacs(): if (id > SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_MAX) return -EOPNOTSUPP; so this wasn't working before and thus it won't break compatibility. Fixes: 65b07e5d ("[SCTP]: API updates to suport SCTP-AUTH extensions.") Signed-off-by:
Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Daniel Borkmann authored
[ Upstream commit 5cfb4c8d ] Since it's introduction in commit 69e3c75f ("net: TX_RING and packet mmap"), TX_RING could be used from SOCK_DGRAM and SOCK_RAW side. When used with SOCK_DGRAM only, the size_max > dev->mtu + reserve check should have reserve as 0, but currently, this is unconditionally set (in it's original form as dev->hard_header_len). I think this is not correct since tpacket_fill_skb() would then take dev->mtu and dev->hard_header_len into account for SOCK_DGRAM, the extra VLAN_HLEN could be possible in both cases. Presumably, the reserve code was copied from packet_snd(), but later on missed the check. Make it similar as we have it in packet_snd(). Fixes: 69e3c75f ("net: TX_RING and packet mmap") Signed-off-by:
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Daniel Borkmann authored
[ Upstream commit c72219b7 ] In case no struct sockaddr_ll has been passed to packet socket's sendmsg() when doing a TX_RING flush run, then skb->protocol is set to po->num instead, which is the protocol passed via socket(2)/bind(2). Applications only xmitting can go the path of allocating the socket as socket(PF_PACKET, <mode>, 0) and do a bind(2) on the TX_RING with sll_protocol of 0. That way, register_prot_hook() is neither called on creation nor on bind time, which saves cycles when there's no interest in capturing anyway. That leaves us however with po->num 0 instead and therefore the TX_RING flush run sets skb->protocol to 0 as well. Eric reported that this leads to problems when using tools like trafgen over bonding device. I.e. the bonding's hash function could invoke the kernel's flow dissector, which depends on skb->protocol being properly set. In the current situation, all the traffic is then directed to a single slave. Fix it up by inferring skb->protocol from the Ethernet header when not set and we have ARPHRD_ETHER device type. This is only done in case of SOCK_RAW and where we have a dev->hard_header_len length. In case of ARPHRD_ETHER devices, this is guaranteed to cover ETH_HLEN, and therefore being accessed on the skb after the skb_store_bits(). Reported-by:
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Daniel Borkmann authored
[ Upstream commit 3c70c132 ] Packet sockets can be used by various net devices and are not really restricted to ARPHRD_ETHER device types. However, when currently checking for the extra 4 bytes that can be transmitted in VLAN case, our assumption is that we generally probe on ARPHRD_ETHER devices. Therefore, before looking into Ethernet header, check the device type first. This also fixes the issue where non-ARPHRD_ETHER devices could have no dev->hard_header_len in TX_RING SOCK_RAW case, and thus the check would test unfilled linear part of the skb (instead of non-linear). Fixes: 57f89bfa ("network: Allow af_packet to transmit +4 bytes for VLAN packets.") Fixes: 52f1454f ("packet: allow to transmit +4 byte in TX_RING slot for VLAN case") Signed-off-by:
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Alexander Drozdov authored
[ Upstream commit dbd46ab4 ] tpacket_fill_skb() can return a negative value (-errno) which is stored in tp_len variable. In that case the following condition will be (but shouldn't be) true: tp_len > dev->mtu + dev->hard_header_len as dev->mtu and dev->hard_header_len are both unsigned. That may lead to just returning an incorrect EMSGSIZE errno to the user. Fixes: 52f1454f ("packet: allow to transmit +4 byte in TX_RING slot for VLAN case") Signed-off-by:
Alexander Drozdov <al.drozdov@gmail.com> Acked-by:
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Daniel Borkmann authored
[ Upstream commit 8fd6c80d ] We concluded that the skb_probe_transport_header() should better be called unconditionally. Avoiding the call into the flow dissector has also not really much to do with the direct xmit mode. While it seems that only virtio_net code makes use of GSO from non RX/TX ring packet socket paths, we should probe for a transport header nevertheless before they hit devices. Reference: http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.network/386173/ Signed-off-by:
Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Daniel Borkmann authored
[ Upstream commit efdfa2f7 ] In tpacket_fill_skb() commit c1aad275 ("packet: set transport header before doing xmit") and later on 40893fd0 ("net: switch to use skb_probe_transport_header()") was probing for a transport header on the skb from a ring buffer slot, but at a time, where the skb has _not even_ been filled with data yet. So that call into the flow dissector is pretty useless. Lets do it after we've set up the skb frags. Fixes: c1aad275 ("packet: set transport header before doing xmit") Reported-by:
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Kamal Mostafa authored
[ Upstream commit d7475de5 ] Use the local uapi headers to keep in sync with "recently" added #define's (e.g. SKF_AD_VLAN_TPID). Refactored CFLAGS, and bpf_asm doesn't need -I. Fixes: 3f356385 ("filter: bpf_asm: add minimal bpf asm tool") Signed-off-by:
Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Acked-by:
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Sasha Levin authored
This reverts commit d9a11334.
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Marcelo Leitner authored
[ Upstream commit 77751427 ] Currently we don't check if the new MTU is valid or not and this allows one to configure a smaller than minimum allowed by RFCs or even bigger than interface own MTU, which is a problem as it may lead to packet drops. If you have a daemon like NetworkManager running, this may be exploited by remote attackers by forging RA packets with an invalid MTU, possibly leading to a DoS. (NetworkManager currently only validates for values too small, but not for too big ones.) The fix is just to make sure the new value is valid. That is, between IPV6_MIN_MTU and interface's MTU. Note that similar check is already performed at ndisc_router_discovery(), for when kernel itself parses the RA. Signed-off-by:
Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Signed-off-by:
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Nadav Amit authored
[ Upstream commit 4be4de7e ] Replace the current canonical address check with the new function which is identical. Signed-off-by:
Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il> Signed-off-by:
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Eric Northup authored
[ Upstream commit 54a20552 ] It was found that a guest can DoS a host by triggering an infinite stream of "alignment check" (#AC) exceptions. This causes the microcode to enter an infinite loop where the core never receives another interrupt. The host kernel panics pretty quickly due to the effects (CVE-2015-5307). Signed-off-by:
Eric Northup <digitaleric@google.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
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Florian Fainelli authored
[ Upstream commit d836ace6 ] DSA expects the host_dev pointer to be the device structure associated with the MDIO bus controller driver. First commit breaking that was c3a07134 ("mv643xx_eth: convert to use the Marvell Orion MDIO driver"), and then, it got completely under the radar for a while. Reported-by:
Frans van de Wiel <fvdw@fvdw.eu> Fixes: c3a07134 ("mv643xx_eth: convert to use the Marvell Orion MDIO driver") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Gregory CLEMENT <gregory.clement@free-electrons.com> Signed-off-by:
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