- Jan 23, 2016
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Greg Kroah-Hartman authored
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Yevgeny Pats authored
commit 23567fd0 upstream. This fixes CVE-2016-0728. If a thread is asked to join as a session keyring the keyring that's already set as its session, we leak a keyring reference. This can be tested with the following program: #include <stddef.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <keyutils.h> int main(int argc, const char *argv[]) { int i = 0; key_serial_t serial; serial = keyctl(KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING, "leaked-keyring"); if (serial < 0) { perror("keyctl"); return -1; } if (keyctl(KEYCTL_SETPERM, serial, KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_ALL) < 0) { perror("keyctl"); return -1; } for (i = 0; i < 100; i++) { serial = keyctl(KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING, "leaked-keyring"); if (serial < 0) { perror("keyctl"); return -1; } } return 0; } If, after the program has run, there something like the following line in /proc/keys: 3f3d898f I--Q--- 100 perm 3f3f0000 0 0 keyring leaked-keyring: empty with a usage count of 100 * the number of times the program has been run, then the kernel is malfunctioning. If leaked-keyring has zero usages or has been garbage collected, then the problem is fixed. Reported-by:
Yevgeny Pats <yevgeny@perception-point.io> Signed-off-by:
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by:
Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com> Acked-by:
Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com> Acked-by:
Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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David Howells authored
commit b4a1b4f5 upstream. This fixes CVE-2015-7550. There's a race between keyctl_read() and keyctl_revoke(). If the revoke happens between keyctl_read() checking the validity of a key and the key's semaphore being taken, then the key type read method will see a revoked key. This causes a problem for the user-defined key type because it assumes in its read method that there will always be a payload in a non-revoked key and doesn't check for a NULL pointer. Fix this by making keyctl_read() check the validity of a key after taking semaphore instead of before. I think the bug was introduced with the original keyrings code. This was discovered by a multithreaded test program generated by syzkaller (http://github.com/google/syzkaller ). Here's a cleaned up version: #include <sys/types.h> #include <keyutils.h> #include <pthread.h> void *thr0(void *arg) { key_serial_t key = (unsigned long)arg; keyctl_revoke(key); return 0; } void *thr1(void *arg) { key_serial_t key = (unsigned long)arg; char buffer[16]; keyctl_read(key, buffer, 16); return 0; } int main() { key_serial_t key = add_key("user", "%", "foo", 3, KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING); pthread_t th[5]; pthread_create(&th[0], 0, thr0, (void *)(unsigned long)key); pthread_create(&th[1], 0, thr1, (void *)(unsigned long)key); pthread_create(&th[2], 0, thr0, (void *)(unsigned long)key); pthread_create(&th[3], 0, thr1, (void *)(unsigned long)key); pthread_join(th[0], 0); pthread_join(th[1], 0); pthread_join(th[2], 0); pthread_join(th[3], 0); return 0; } Build as: cc -o keyctl-race keyctl-race.c -lkeyutils -lpthread Run as: while keyctl-race; do :; done as it may need several iterations to crash the kernel. The crash can be summarised as: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010 IP: [<ffffffff81279b08>] user_read+0x56/0xa3 ... Call Trace: [<ffffffff81276aa9>] keyctl_read_key+0xb6/0xd7 [<ffffffff81277815>] SyS_keyctl+0x83/0xe0 [<ffffffff815dbb97>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f Reported-by:
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by:
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David Howells authored
commit f05819df upstream. The following sequence of commands: i=`keyctl add user a a @s` keyctl request2 keyring foo bar @t keyctl unlink $i @s tries to invoke an upcall to instantiate a keyring if one doesn't already exist by that name within the user's keyring set. However, if the upcall fails, the code sets keyring->type_data.reject_error to -ENOKEY or some other error code. When the key is garbage collected, the key destroy function is called unconditionally and keyring_destroy() uses list_empty() on keyring->type_data.link - which is in a union with reject_error. Subsequently, the kernel tries to unlink the keyring from the keyring names list - which oopses like this: BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffff8a IP: [<ffffffff8126e051>] keyring_destroy+0x3d/0x88 ... Workqueue: events key_garbage_collector ... RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8126e051>] keyring_destroy+0x3d/0x88 RSP: 0018:ffff88003e2f3d30 EFLAGS: 00010203 RAX: 00000000ffffff82 RBX: ffff88003bf1a900 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000003bfc6901 RDI: ffffffff81a73a40 RBP: ffff88003e2f3d38 R08: 0000000000000152 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffff88003e2f3c18 R11: 000000000000865b R12: ffff88003bf1a900 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff88003bf1a908 R15: ffff88003e2f4000 ... CR2: 00000000ffffff8a CR3: 000000003e3ec000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 ... Call Trace: [<ffffffff8126c756>] key_gc_unused_keys.constprop.1+0x5d/0x10f [<ffffffff8126ca71>] key_garbage_collector+0x1fa/0x351 [<ffffffff8105ec9b>] process_one_work+0x28e/0x547 [<ffffffff8105fd17>] worker_thread+0x26e/0x361 [<ffffffff8105faa9>] ? rescuer_thread+0x2a8/0x2a8 [<ffffffff810648ad>] kthread+0xf3/0xfb [<ffffffff810647ba>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x1c2/0x1c2 [<ffffffff815f2ccf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70 [<ffffffff810647ba>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x1c2/0x1c2 Note the value in RAX. This is a 32-bit representation of -ENOKEY. The solution is to only call ->destroy() if the key was successfully instantiated. Reported-by:
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David Howells authored
commit 94c4554b upstream. There appears to be a race between: (1) key_gc_unused_keys() which frees key->security and then calls keyring_destroy() to unlink the name from the name list (2) find_keyring_by_name() which calls key_permission(), thus accessing key->security, on a key before checking to see whether the key usage is 0 (ie. the key is dead and might be cleaned up). Fix this by calling ->destroy() before cleaning up the core key data - including key->security. Reported-by:
Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Rainer Weikusat authored
[ Upstream commit 3822b5c2 ] With b3ca9b02 , the AF_UNIX SOCK_STREAM receive code was changed from using mutex_lock(&u->readlock) to mutex_lock_interruptible(&u->readlock) to prevent signals from being delayed for an indefinite time if a thread sleeping on the mutex happened to be selected for handling the signal. But this was never a problem with the stream receive code (as opposed to its datagram counterpart) as that never went to sleep waiting for new messages with the mutex held and thus, wouldn't cause secondary readers to block on the mutex waiting for the sleeping primary reader. As the interruptible locking makes the code more complicated in exchange for no benefit, change it back to using mutex_lock. Signed-off-by:
Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com> Acked-by:
Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by:
David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by:
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David S. Miller authored
[ Upstream commit 5233252f ] Signed-off-by:
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WANG Cong authored
[ Upstream commit 09ccfd23 ] Reported-by:
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Sergei Shtylyov authored
[ Upstream commit 248be83d ] In a low memory situation the following kernel oops occurs: Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000050 pgd = 8490c000 [00000050] *pgd=4651e831, *pte=00000000, *ppte=00000000 Internal error: Oops: 17 [#1] PREEMPT ARM Modules linked in: CPU: 0 Not tainted (3.4-at16 #9) PC is at skb_put+0x10/0x98 LR is at sh_eth_poll+0x2c8/0xa10 pc : [<8035f780>] lr : [<8028bf50>] psr: 60000113 sp : 84eb1a90 ip : 84eb1ac8 fp : 84eb1ac4 r10: 0000003f r9 : 000005ea r8 : 00000000 r7 : 00000000 r6 : 940453b0 r5 : 00030000 r4 : 9381b180 r3 : 00000000 r2 : 00000000 r1 : 000005ea r0 : 00000000 Flags: nZCv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment user Control: 10c53c7d Table: 4248c059 DAC: 00000015 Process klogd (pid: 2046, stack limit = 0x84eb02e8) [...] This is because netdev_alloc_skb() fails and 'mdp->rx_skbuff[entry]' is left NULL but sh_eth_rx() later uses it without checking. Add such check... Reported-by:
Yasushi SHOJI <yashi@atmark-techno.com> Signed-off-by:
Sergei Shtylyov <sergei.shtylyov@cogentembedded.com> Signed-off-by:
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Hannes Frederic Sowa authored
[ Upstream commit 79462ad0 ] 郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by using a simple program: int socket_fd; struct sockaddr_in addr; addr.sin_port = 0; addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY; addr.sin_family = 10; socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000); connect(socket_fd , &addr,16); AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly, thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and store a zero in the protocol fields. This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which is NULL for raw sockets. kernel: Call Trace: kernel: [<ffffffff816db90e>] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70 kernel: [<ffffffff816db9a4>] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80 kernel: [<ffffffff81645069>] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110 kernel: [<ffffffff810ac51b>] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80 kernel: [<ffffffff810236d8>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200 kernel: [<ffffffff81645e0e>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10 kernel: [<ffffffff81779515>] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89 I found no particular commit which introduced this problem. CVE: CVE-2015-8543 Cc: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com> Reported-by:
郭永刚 <guoyonggang@360.cn> Signed-off-by:
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Eric Dumazet authored
[ Upstream commit 9470e24f ] SCTP is lacking proper np->opt cloning at accept() time. TCP and DCCP use ipv6_dup_options() helper, do the same in SCTP. We might later factorize this code in a common helper to avoid future mistakes. Reported-by:
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Acked-by:
Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Marcelo Ricardo Leitner authored
[ Upstream commit 01ce63c9 ] Dmitry Vyukov reported that SCTP was triggering a WARN on socket destroy related to disabling sock timestamp. When SCTP accepts an association or peel one off, it copies sock flags but forgot to call net_enable_timestamp() if a packet timestamping flag was copied, leading to extra calls to net_disable_timestamp() whenever such clones were closed. The fix is to call net_enable_timestamp() whenever we copy a sock with that flag on, like tcp does. Reported-by:
Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com> Acked-by:
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Pavel Machek authored
[ Upstream commit f2a3771a ] atl1c driver is doing order-4 allocation with GFP_ATOMIC priority. That often breaks networking after resume. Switch to GFP_KERNEL. Still not ideal, but should be significantly better. atl1c_setup_ring_resources() is called from .open() function, and already uses GFP_KERNEL, so this change is safe. Signed-off-by:
Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Acked-by:
Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Signed-off-by:
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Nicolas Dichtel authored
[ Upstream commit 6a61d4db ] Parameters were updated only if the kernel was unable to find the tunnel with the new parameters, ie only if core pamareters were updated (keys, addr, link, type). Now it's possible to update ttl, hoplimit, flowinfo and flags. Fixes: c12b395a ("gre: Support GRE over IPv6") Signed-off-by:
Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Signed-off-by:
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Ben Hutchings authored
commit 5377adb0 upstream. usb_parse_ss_endpoint_companion() now decodes the burst multiplier correctly in order to check that it's <= 3, but still uses the wrong expression if warning that it's > 3. Fixes: ff30cbc8 ("usb: Use the USB_SS_MULT() macro to get the ...") Signed-off-by:
Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by:
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Alexey Khoroshilov authored
commit f9fa1887 upstream. qset_fill_page_list() do not check for dma mapping errors. Found by Linux Driver Verification project (linuxtesting.org). Signed-off-by:
Alexey Khoroshilov <khoroshilov@ispras.ru> Signed-off-by:
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Alan Stern authored
commit ad87e032 upstream. Some USB device / host controller combinations seem to have problems with Link Power Management. For example, Steinar found that his xHCI controller wouldn't handle bandwidth calculations correctly for two video cards simultaneously when LPM was enabled, even though the bus had plenty of bandwidth available. This patch introduces a new quirk flag for devices that should remain disabled for LPM, and creates quirk entries for Steinar's devices. Signed-off-by:
Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Reported-by:
Steinar H. Gunderson <sgunderson@bigfoot.com> Signed-off-by:
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Konstantin Shkolnyy authored
commit 7c90e610 upstream. CP2110 ID (0x10c4, 0xea80) doesn't belong here because it's a HID and completely different from CP210x devices. Signed-off-by:
Konstantin Shkolnyy <konstantin.shkolnyy@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Jonas Jonsson authored
commit f33a7f72 upstream. Some modems, such as the Telit UE910, are using an Infineon Flash Loader utility. It has two interfaces, 2/2/0 (Abstract Modem) and 10/0/0 (CDC Data). The latter can be used as a serial interface to upgrade the firmware of the modem. However, that isn't possible when the cdc-acm driver takes control of the device. The following is an explanation of the behaviour by Daniele Palmas during discussion on linux-usb. "This is what happens when the device is turned on (without modifying the drivers): [155492.352031] usb 1-3: new high-speed USB device number 27 using ehci-pci [155492.485429] usb 1-3: config 1 interface 0 altsetting 0 endpoint 0x81 has an invalid bInterval 255, changing to 11 [155492.485436] usb 1-3: New USB device found, idVendor=058b, idProduct=0041 [155492.485439] usb 1-3: New USB device strings: Mfr=0, Product=0, SerialNumber=0 [155492.485952] cdc_acm 1-3:1.0: ttyACM0: USB ACM device This is the flashing device that is caught by the cdc-acm driver. Once the ttyACM appears, the application starts sending a magic string (simple write on the file descriptor) to keep the device in flashing mode. If this magic string is not properly received in a certain time interval, the modem goes on in normal operative mode: [155493.748094] usb 1-3: USB disconnect, device number 27 [155494.916025] usb 1-3: new high-speed USB device number 28 using ehci-pci [155495.059978] usb 1-3: New USB device found, idVendor=1bc7, idProduct=0021 [155495.059983] usb 1-3: New USB device strings: Mfr=1, Product=2, SerialNumber=3 [155495.059986] usb 1-3: Product: 6 CDC-ACM + 1 CDC-ECM [155495.059989] usb 1-3: Manufacturer: Telit [155495.059992] usb 1-3: SerialNumber: 359658044004697 [155495.138958] cdc_acm 1-3:1.0: ttyACM0: USB ACM device [155495.140832] cdc_acm 1-3:1.2: ttyACM1: USB ACM device [155495.142827] cdc_acm 1-3:1.4: ttyACM2: USB ACM device [155495.144462] cdc_acm 1-3:1.6: ttyACM3: USB ACM device [155495.145967] cdc_acm 1-3:1.8: ttyACM4: USB ACM device [155495.147588] cdc_acm 1-3:1.10: ttyACM5: USB ACM device [155495.154322] cdc_ether 1-3:1.12 wwan0: register 'cdc_ether' at usb-0000:00:1a.7-3, Mobile Broadband Network Device, 00:00:11:12:13:14 Using the cdc-acm driver, the string, though being sent in the same way than using the usb-serial-simple driver (I can confirm that the data is passing properly since I used an hw usb sniffer), does not make the device to stay in flashing mode." Signed-off-by:
Jonas Jonsson <jonas@ludd.ltu.se> Tested-by:
Daniele Palmas <dnlplm@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Jeff Layton authored
commit c812012f upstream. If we pass in an empty nfs_fattr struct to nfs_update_inode, it will (correctly) not update any of the attributes, but it then clears the NFS_INO_INVALID_ATTR flag, which indicates that the attributes are up to date. Don't clear the flag if the fattr struct has no valid attrs to apply. Reviewed-by:
Steve French <steve.french@primarydata.com> Signed-off-by:
Jeff Layton <jeff.layton@primarydata.com> Signed-off-by:
Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com> Signed-off-by:
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Benjamin Coddington authored
commit c68a027c upstream. If clp->cl_cb_ident is zero, then nfs_cb_idr_remove_locked() skips removing it when the nfs_client is freed. A decoding or server bug can then find and try to put that first nfs_client which would lead to a crash. Signed-off-by:
Benjamin Coddington <bcodding@redhat.com> Fixes: d6870312 ("nfs4client: convert to idr_alloc()") Signed-off-by:
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Stefan Richter authored
commit 100ceb66 upstream. Reported by Clifford and Craig for JMicron OHCI-1394 + SDHCI combo controllers: Often or even most of the time, the controller is initialized with the message "added OHCI v1.10 device as card 0, 4 IR + 0 IT contexts, quirks 0x10". With 0 isochronous transmit DMA contexts (IT contexts), applications like audio output are impossible. However, OHCI-1394 demands that at least 4 IT contexts are implemented by the link layer controller, and indeed JMicron JMB38x do implement four of them. Only their IsoXmitIntMask register is unreliable at early access. With my own JMB381 single function controller I found: - I can reproduce the problem with a lower probability than Craig's. - If I put a loop around the section which clears and reads IsoXmitIntMask, then either the first or the second attempt will return the correct initial mask of 0x0000000f. I never encountered a case of needing more than a second attempt. - Consequently, if I put a dummy reg_read(...IsoXmitIntMaskSet) before the first write, the subsequent read will return the correct result. - If I merely ignore a wrong read result and force the known real result, later isochronous transmit DMA usage works just fine. So let's just fix this chip bug up by the latter method. Tested with JMB381 on kernel 3.13 and 4.3. Since OHCI-1394 generally requires 4 IT contexts at a minium, this workaround is simply applied whenever the initial read of IsoXmitIntMask returns 0, regardless whether it's a JMicron chip or not. I never heard of this issue together with any other chip though. I am not 100% sure that this fix works on the OHCI-1394 part of JMB380 and JMB388 combo controllers exactly the same as on the JMB381 single- function controller, but so far I haven't had a chance to let an owner of a combo chip run a patched kernel. Strangely enough, IsoRecvIntMask is always reported correctly, even though it is probed right before IsoXmitIntMask. Reported-by: Clifford Dunn Reported-by:
Craig Moore <craig.moore@qenos.com> Signed-off-by:
Stefan Richter <stefanr@s5r6.in-berlin.de> Signed-off-by:
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Daeho Jeong authored
commit 4327ba52 upstream. If a EXT4 filesystem utilizes JBD2 journaling and an error occurs, the journaling will be aborted first and the error number will be recorded into JBD2 superblock and, finally, the system will enter into the panic state in "errors=panic" option. But, in the rare case, this sequence is little twisted like the below figure and it will happen that the system enters into panic state, which means the system reset in mobile environment, before completion of recording an error in the journal superblock. In this case, e2fsck cannot recognize that the filesystem failure occurred in the previous run and the corruption wouldn't be fixed. Task A Task B ext4_handle_error() -> jbd2_journal_abort() -> __journal_abort_soft() -> __jbd2_journal_abort_hard() | -> journal->j_flags |= JBD2_ABORT; | | __ext4_abort() | -> jbd2_journal_abort() | | -> __journal_abort_soft() | | -> if (journal->j_flags & JBD2_ABORT) | | return; | -> panic() | -> jbd2_journal_update_sb_errno() Tested-by:
Hobin Woo <hobin.woo@samsung.com> Signed-off-by:
Daeho Jeong <daeho.jeong@samsung.com> Signed-off-by:
Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by:
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Filipe Manana authored
commit 1d512cb7 upstream. If we are using the NO_HOLES feature, we have a tiny time window when running delalloc for a nodatacow inode where we can race with a concurrent link or xattr add operation leading to a BUG_ON. This happens because at run_delalloc_nocow() we end up casting a leaf item of type BTRFS_INODE_[REF|EXTREF]_KEY or of type BTRFS_XATTR_ITEM_KEY to a file extent item (struct btrfs_file_extent_item) and then analyse its extent type field, which won't match any of the expected extent types (values BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_[REG|PREALLOC|INLINE]) and therefore trigger an explicit BUG_ON(1). The following sequence diagram shows how the race happens when running a no-cow dellaloc range [4K, 8K[ for inode 257 and we have the following neighbour leafs: Leaf X (has N items) Leaf Y [ ... (257 INODE_ITEM 0) (257 INODE_REF 256) ] [ (257 EXTENT_DATA 8192), ... ] slot N - 2 slot N - 1 slot 0 (Note the implicit hole for inode 257 regarding the [0, 8K[ range) CPU 1 CPU 2 run_dealloc_nocow() btrfs_lookup_file_extent() --> searches for a key with value (257 EXTENT_DATA 4096) in the fs/subvol tree --> returns us a path with path->nodes[0] == leaf X and path->slots[0] == N because path->slots[0] is >= btrfs_header_nritems(leaf X), it calls btrfs_next_leaf() btrfs_next_leaf() --> releases the path hard link added to our inode, with key (257 INODE_REF 500) added to the end of leaf X, so leaf X now has N + 1 keys --> searches for the key (257 INODE_REF 256), because it was the last key in leaf X before it released the path, with path->keep_locks set to 1 --> ends up at leaf X again and it verifies that the key (257 INODE_REF 256) is no longer the last key in the leaf, so it returns with path->nodes[0] == leaf X and path->slots[0] == N, pointing to the new item with key (257 INODE_REF 500) the loop iteration of run_dealloc_nocow() does not break out the loop and continues because the key referenced in the path at path->nodes[0] and path->slots[0] is for inode 257, its type is < BTRFS_EXTENT_DATA_KEY and its offset (500) is less then our delalloc range's end (8192) the item pointed by the path, an inode reference item, is (incorrectly) interpreted as a file extent item and we get an invalid extent type, leading to the BUG_ON(1): if (extent_type == BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_REG || extent_type == BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_PREALLOC) { (...) } else if (extent_type == BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_INLINE) { (...) } else { BUG_ON(1) } The same can happen if a xattr is added concurrently and ends up having a key with an offset smaller then the delalloc's range end. So fix this by skipping keys with a type smaller than BTRFS_EXTENT_DATA_KEY. Signed-off-by:
Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by:
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Eric Dumazet authored
[ Upstream commit 602dd62d ] Dmitry Vyukov reported a memory leak using IPV6 SCTP sockets. We need to call inet6_destroy_sock() to properly release inet6 specific fields. Reported-by:
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by:
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Michal Kubeček authored
[ Upstream commit 264640fc ] If a fragmented multicast packet is received on an ethernet device which has an active macvlan on top of it, each fragment is duplicated and received both on the underlying device and the macvlan. If some fragments for macvlan are processed before the whole packet for the underlying device is reassembled, the "overlapping fragments" test in ip6_frag_queue() discards the whole fragment queue. To resolve this, add device ifindex to the search key and require it to match reassembling multicast packets and packets to link-local addresses. Note: similar patch has been already submitted by Yoshifuji Hideaki in http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/220979/ but got lost and forgotten for some reason. Signed-off-by:
Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz> Signed-off-by:
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Aaro Koskinen authored
[ Upstream commit 3c25a860 ] Commit fcb26ec5 ("broadcom: move all PHY_ID's to header") updated broadcom_tbl to use PHY_IDs, but incorrectly replaced 0x0143bca0 with PHY_ID_BCM5482 (making a duplicate entry, and completely omitting the original). Fix that. Fixes: fcb26ec5 ("broadcom: move all PHY_ID's to header") Signed-off-by:
Aaro Koskinen <aaro.koskinen@iki.fi> Signed-off-by:
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Nikolay Aleksandrov authored
[ Upstream commit 4c698046 ] Similar to ipv4, when destroying an mrt table the static mfc entries and the static devices are kept, which leads to devices that can never be destroyed (because of refcnt taken) and leaked memory. Make sure that everything is cleaned up on netns destruction. Fixes: 8229efda ("netns: ip6mr: enable namespace support in ipv6 multicast forwarding code") CC: Benjamin Thery <benjamin.thery@bull.net> Signed-off-by:
Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com> Reviewed-by:
Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com> Signed-off-by:
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Nikolay Aleksandrov authored
[ Upstream commit 0e615e96 ] When destroying an mrt table the static mfc entries and the static devices are kept, which leads to devices that can never be destroyed (because of refcnt taken) and leaked memory, for example: unreferenced object 0xffff880034c144c0 (size 192): comm "mfc-broken", pid 4777, jiffies 4320349055 (age 46001.964s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 98 53 f0 34 00 88 ff ff 98 53 f0 34 00 88 ff ff .S.4.....S.4.... ef 0a 0a 14 01 02 03 04 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 ................ backtrace: [<ffffffff815c1b9e>] kmemleak_alloc+0x4e/0xb0 [<ffffffff811ea6e0>] kmem_cache_alloc+0x190/0x300 [<ffffffff815931cb>] ip_mroute_setsockopt+0x5cb/0x910 [<ffffffff8153d575>] do_ip_setsockopt.isra.11+0x105/0xff0 [<ffffffff8153e490>] ip_setsockopt+0x30/0xa0 [<ffffffff81564e13>] raw_setsockopt+0x33/0x90 [<ffffffff814d1e14>] sock_common_setsockopt+0x14/0x20 [<ffffffff814d0b51>] SyS_setsockopt+0x71/0xc0 [<ffffffff815cdbf6>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a [<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff Make sure that everything is cleaned on netns destruction. Signed-off-by:
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Daniel Borkmann authored
[ Upstream commit 6900317f ] David and HacKurx reported a following/similar size overflow triggered in a grsecurity kernel, thanks to PaX's gcc size overflow plugin: (Already fixed in later grsecurity versions by Brad and PaX Team.) [ 1002.296137] PAX: size overflow detected in function scm_detach_fds net/core/scm.c:314 cicus.202_127 min, count: 4, decl: msg_controllen; num: 0; context: msghdr; [ 1002.296145] CPU: 0 PID: 3685 Comm: scm_rights_recv Not tainted 4.2.3-grsec+ #7 [ 1002.296149] Hardware name: Apple Inc. MacBookAir5,1/Mac-66F35F19FE2A0D05, [...] [ 1002.296153] ffffffff81c27366 0000000000000000 ffffffff81c27375 ffffc90007843aa8 [ 1002.296162] ffffffff818129ba 0000000000000000 ffffffff81c27366 ffffc90007843ad8 [ 1002.296169] ffffffff8121f838 fffffffffffffffc fffffffffffffffc ffffc90007843e60 [ 1002.296176] Call Trace: [ 1002.296190] [<ffffffff818129ba>] dump_stack+0x45/0x57 [ 1002.296200] [<ffffffff8121f838>] report_size_overflow+0x38/0x60 [ 1002.296209] [<ffffffff816a979e>] scm_detach_fds+0x2ce/0x300 [ 1002.296220] [<ffffffff81791899>] unix_stream_read_generic+0x609/0x930 [ 1002.296228] [<ffffffff81791c9f>] unix_stream_recvmsg+0x4f/0x60 [ 1002.296236] [<ffffffff8178dc00>] ? unix_set_peek_off+0x50/0x50 [ 1002.296243] [<ffffffff8168fac7>] sock_recvmsg+0x47/0x60 [ 1002.296248] [<ffffffff81691522>] ___sys_recvmsg+0xe2/0x1e0 [ 1002.296257] [<ffffffff81693496>] __sys_recvmsg+0x46/0x80 [ 1002.296263] [<ffffffff816934fc>] SyS_recvmsg+0x2c/0x40 [ 1002.296271] [<ffffffff8181a3ab>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x85 Further investigation showed that this can happen when an *odd* number of fds are being passed over AF_UNIX sockets. In these cases CMSG_LEN(i * sizeof(int)) and CMSG_SPACE(i * sizeof(int)), where i is the number of successfully passed fds, differ by 4 bytes due to the extra CMSG_ALIGN() padding in CMSG_SPACE() to an 8 byte boundary on 64 bit. The padding is used to align subsequent cmsg headers in the control buffer. When the control buffer passed in from the receiver side *lacks* these 4 bytes (e.g. due to buggy/wrong API usage), then msg->msg_controllen will overflow in scm_detach_fds(): int cmlen = CMSG_LEN(i * sizeof(int)); <--- cmlen w/o tail-padding err = put_user(SOL_SOCKET, &cm->cmsg_level); if (!err) err = put_user(SCM_RIGHTS, &cm->cmsg_type); if (!err) err = put_user(cmlen, &cm->cmsg_len); if (!err) { cmlen = CMSG_SPACE(i * sizeof(int)); <--- cmlen w/ 4 byte extra tail-padding msg->msg_control += cmlen; msg->msg_controllen -= cmlen; <--- iff no tail-padding space here ... } ... wrap-around F.e. it will wrap to a length of 18446744073709551612 bytes in case the receiver passed in msg->msg_controllen of 20 bytes, and the sender properly transferred 1 fd to the receiver, so that its CMSG_LEN results in 20 bytes and CMSG_SPACE in 24 bytes. In case of MSG_CMSG_COMPAT (scm_detach_fds_compat()), I haven't seen an issue in my tests as alignment seems always on 4 byte boundary. Same should be in case of native 32 bit, where we end up with 4 byte boundaries as well. In practice, passing msg->msg_controllen of 20 to recvmsg() while receiving a single fd would mean that on successful return, msg->msg_controllen is being set by the kernel to 24 bytes instead, thus more than the input buffer advertised. It could f.e. become an issue if such application later on zeroes or copies the control buffer based on the returned msg->msg_controllen elsewhere. Maximum number of fds we can send is a hard upper limit SCM_MAX_FD (253). Going over the code, it seems like msg->msg_controllen is not being read after scm_detach_fds() in scm_recv() anymore by the kernel, good! Relevant recvmsg() handler are unix_dgram_recvmsg() (unix_seqpacket_recvmsg()) and unix_stream_recvmsg(). Both return back to their recvmsg() caller, and ___sys_recvmsg() places the updated length, that is, new msg_control - old msg_control pointer into msg->msg_controllen (hence the 24 bytes seen in the example). Long time ago, Wei Yongjun fixed something related in commit 1ac70e7a ("[NET]: Fix function put_cmsg() which may cause usr application memory overflow"). RFC3542, section 20.2. says: The fields shown as "XX" are possible padding, between the cmsghdr structure and the data, and between the data and the next cmsghdr structure, if required by the implementation. While sending an application may or may not include padding at the end of last ancillary data in msg_controllen and implementations must accept both as valid. On receiving a portable application must provide space for padding at the end of the last ancillary data as implementations may copy out the padding at the end of the control message buffer and include it in the received msg_controllen. When recvmsg() is called if msg_controllen is too small for all the ancillary data items including any trailing padding after the last item an implementation may set MSG_CTRUNC. Since we didn't place MSG_CTRUNC for already quite a long time, just do the same as in 1ac70e7a to avoid an overflow. Btw, even man-page author got this wrong :/ See db939c9b26e9 ("cmsg.3: Fix error in SCM_RIGHTS code sample"). Some people must have copied this (?), thus it got triggered in the wild (reported several times during boot by David and HacKurx). No Fixes tag this time as pre 2002 (that is, pre history tree). Reported-by:
David Sterba <dave@jikos.cz> Reported-by:
HacKurx <hackurx@gmail.com> Cc: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu> Cc: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com> Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Cc: Wei Yongjun <yongjun_wei@trendmicro.com.cn> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reviewed-by:
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Eric Dumazet authored
[ Upstream commit 142a2e7e ] Dmitry provided a syzkaller (http://github.com/google/syzkaller ) generated program that triggers the WARNING at net/ipv4/tcp.c:1729 in tcp_recvmsg() : WARN_ON(tp->copied_seq != tp->rcv_nxt && !(flags & (MSG_PEEK | MSG_TRUNC))); His program is specifically attempting a Cross SYN TCP exchange, that we support (for the pleasure of hackers ?), but it looks we lack proper tcp->copied_seq initialization. Thanks again Dmitry for your report and testings. Signed-off-by:
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Eric Dumazet authored
[ Upstream commit 1b8e6a01 ] When a passive TCP is created, we eventually call tcp_md5_do_add() with sk pointing to the child. It is not owner by the user yet (we will add this socket into listener accept queue a bit later anyway) But we do own the spinlock, so amend the lockdep annotation to avoid following splat : [ 8451.090932] net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:923 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage! [ 8451.090932] [ 8451.090932] other info that might help us debug this: [ 8451.090932] [ 8451.090934] [ 8451.090934] rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 1 [ 8451.090936] 3 locks held by socket_sockopt_/214795: [ 8451.090936] #0: (rcu_read_lock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff855c6ac1>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x151/0xe90 [ 8451.090947] #1: (rcu_read_lock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff85618143>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x43/0x2b0 [ 8451.090952] #2: (slock-AF_INET){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff855acda5>] sk_clone_lock+0x1c5/0x500 [ 8451.090958] [ 8451.090958] stack backtrace: [ 8451.090960] CPU: 7 PID: 214795 Comm: socket_sockopt_ [ 8451.091215] Call Trace: [ 8451.091216] <IRQ> [<ffffffff856fb29c>] dump_stack+0x55/0x76 [ 8451.091229] [<ffffffff85123b5b>] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xeb/0x110 [ 8451.091235] [<ffffffff8564544f>] tcp_md5_do_add+0x1bf/0x1e0 [ 8451.091239] [<ffffffff85645751>] tcp_v4_syn_recv_sock+0x1f1/0x4c0 [ 8451.091242] [<ffffffff85642b27>] ? tcp_v4_md5_hash_skb+0x167/0x190 [ 8451.091246] [<ffffffff85647c78>] tcp_check_req+0x3c8/0x500 [ 8451.091249] [<ffffffff856451ae>] ? tcp_v4_inbound_md5_hash+0x11e/0x190 [ 8451.091253] [<ffffffff85647170>] tcp_v4_rcv+0x3c0/0x9f0 [ 8451.091256] [<ffffffff85618143>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x43/0x2b0 [ 8451.091260] [<ffffffff856181b6>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xb6/0x2b0 [ 8451.091263] [<ffffffff85618143>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x43/0x2b0 [ 8451.091267] [<ffffffff85618d38>] ip_local_deliver+0x48/0x80 [ 8451.091270] [<ffffffff85618510>] ip_rcv_finish+0x160/0x700 [ 8451.091273] [<ffffffff8561900e>] ip_rcv+0x29e/0x3d0 [ 8451.091277] [<ffffffff855c74b7>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0xb47/0xe90 Fixes: a8afca03 ("tcp: md5: protects md5sig_info with RCU") Signed-off-by:
Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Signed-off-by:
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Bjørn Mork authored
[ Upstream commit 68242a5a ] Thomas reports " 4gsystems sells two total different LTE-surfsticks under the same name. .. The newer version of XS Stick W100 is from "omega" .. Under windows the driver switches to the same ID, and uses MI03\6 for network and MI01\6 for modem. .. echo "1c9e 9b01" > /sys/bus/usb/drivers/qmi_wwan/new_id echo "1c9e 9b01" > /sys/bus/usb-serial/drivers/option1/new_id T: Bus=01 Lev=01 Prnt=01 Port=03 Cnt=01 Dev#= 4 Spd=480 MxCh= 0 D: Ver= 2.00 Cls=00(>ifc ) Sub=00 Prot=00 MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 1 P: Vendor=1c9e ProdID=9b01 Rev=02.32 S: Manufacturer=USB Modem S: Product=USB Modem S: SerialNumber= C: #Ifs= 5 Cfg#= 1 Atr=80 MxPwr=500mA I: If#= 0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=option I: If#= 1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=option I: If#= 2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=option I: If#= 3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=qmi_wwan I: If#= 4 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=08(stor.) Sub=06 Prot=50 Driver=usb-storage Now all important things are there: wwp0s29f7u2i3 (net), ttyUSB2 (at), cdc-wdm0 (qmi), ttyUSB1 (at) There is also ttyUSB0, but it is not usable, at least not for at. The device works well with qmi and ModemManager-NetworkManager. " Reported-by:
Thomas Schäfer <tschaefer@t-online.de> Signed-off-by:
Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no> Signed-off-by:
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Neil Horman authored
[ Upstream commit 41033f02 ] the OUTMCAST stat is double incremented, getting bumped once in the mcast code itself, and again in the common ip output path. Remove the mcast bump, as its not needed Validated by the reporter, with good results Signed-off-by:
Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Reported-by:
Claus Jensen <claus.jensen@microsemi.com> CC: Claus Jensen <claus.jensen@microsemi.com> CC: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by:
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lucien authored
[ Upstream commit ed5a377d ] now sctp auth cannot work well when setting a hmacid manually, which is caused by that we didn't use the network order for hmacid, so fix it by adding the transformation in sctp_auth_ep_set_hmacs. even we set hmacid with the network order in userspace, it still can't work, because of this condition in sctp_auth_ep_set_hmacs(): if (id > SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_MAX) return -EOPNOTSUPP; so this wasn't working before and thus it won't break compatibility. Fixes: 65b07e5d ("[SCTP]: API updates to suport SCTP-AUTH extensions.") Signed-off-by:
Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Rainer Weikusat authored
[ Upstream commit 7d267278 ] Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com> writes: An AF_UNIX datagram socket being the client in an n:1 association with some server socket is only allowed to send messages to the server if the receive queue of this socket contains at most sk_max_ack_backlog datagrams. This implies that prospective writers might be forced to go to sleep despite none of the message presently enqueued on the server receive queue were sent by them. In order to ensure that these will be woken up once space becomes again available, the present unix_dgram_poll routine does a second sock_poll_wait call with the peer_wait wait queue of the server socket as queue argument (unix_dgram_recvmsg does a wake up on this queue after a datagram was received). This is inherently problematic because the server socket is only guaranteed to remain alive for as long as the client still holds a reference to it. In case the connection is dissolved via connect or by the dead peer detection logic in unix_dgram_sendmsg, the server socket may be freed despite "the polling mechanism" (in particular, epoll) still has a pointer to the corresponding peer_wait queue. There's no way to forcibly deregister a wait queue with epoll. Based on an idea by Jason Baron, the patch below changes the code such that a wait_queue_t belonging to the client socket is enqueued on the peer_wait queue of the server whenever the peer receive queue full condition is detected by either a sendmsg or a poll. A wake up on the peer queue is then relayed to the ordinary wait queue of the client socket via wake function. The connection to the peer wait queue is again dissolved if either a wake up is about to be relayed or the client socket reconnects or a dead peer is detected or the client socket is itself closed. This enables removing the second sock_poll_wait from unix_dgram_poll, thus avoiding the use-after-free, while still ensuring that no blocked writer sleeps forever. Signed-off-by:
Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com> Signed-off-by:
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- Dec 09, 2015
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Greg Kroah-Hartman authored
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Clemens Ladisch authored
commit a91e627e upstream. One of the many faults of the QinHeng CH345 USB MIDI interface chip is that it does not handle received SysEx messages correctly -- every second event packet has a wrong code index number, which is the one from the last seen message, instead of 4. For example, the two messages "FE F0 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E F7" result in the following event packets: correct: CH345: 0F FE 00 00 0F FE 00 00 04 F0 01 02 04 F0 01 02 04 03 04 05 0F 03 04 05 04 06 07 08 04 06 07 08 04 09 0A 0B 0F 09 0A 0B 04 0C 0D 0E 04 0C 0D 0E 05 F7 00 00 05 F7 00 00 A class-compliant driver must interpret an event packet with CIN 15 as having a single data byte, so the other two bytes would be ignored. The message received by the host would then be missing two bytes out of six; in this example, "F0 01 02 03 06 07 08 09 0C 0D 0E F7". These corrupted SysEx event packages contain only data bytes, while the CH345 uses event packets with a correct CIN value only for messages with a status byte, so it is possible to distinguish between these two cases by checking for the presence of this status byte. (Other bugs in the CH345's input handling, such as the corruption resulting from running status, cannot be worked around.) Signed-off-by:
Clemens Ladisch <clemens@ladisch.de> Signed-off-by:
Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Signed-off-by:
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Clemens Ladisch authored
commit 1ca8b201 upstream. The CH345 USB MIDI chip has two output ports. However, they are multiplexed through one pin, and the number of ports cannot be reduced even for hardware that implements only one connector, so for those devices, data sent to either port ends up on the same hardware output. This becomes a problem when both ports are used at the same time, as longer MIDI commands (such as SysEx messages) are likely to be interrupted by messages from the other port, and thus to get lost. It would not be possible for the driver to detect how many ports the device actually has, except that in practice, _all_ devices built with the CH345 have only one port. So we can just ignore the device's descriptors, and hardcode one output port. Signed-off-by:
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Clemens Ladisch authored
commit 98d362be upstream. Signed-off-by:
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